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Abstract 
The beginning of the employment career is often associated with phases of unem-
ployment. We argue that unemployment has different implications for different edu-
cational groups on future employment career depending on institutional settings in 
the UK and Germany. While search and matching models argue that an unemploy-
ment phase might be used for an active job search and might result in a better posi-
tion, human capital and signalling theory predict status losses. The strongly skill-
based and rigid labour market in Germany creates a stigma attached to unemploy-
ment and therefore might have negative consequences upon the re-entry into the 
labour market for all educational groups. The ‘trial and error’ strategy at the begin-
ning of an employment career in flexible labour markets is common and therefore 
search and matching models should predict positive outcomes in the UK, especially 
for high-educated persons. Using the German Socio-Economic Panel and British 




Gerade am Anfang der Erwerbskarriere ist Arbeitslosigkeit keine Seltenheit. In die-
sem Artikel argumentieren wir, dass in Abhängigkeit von institutionellen Rahmenbe-
dingungen Arbeitslosigkeit verschiedene Konsequenzen für die zukünftige Erwerbs-
karriere in Großbritannien und Deutschland hat. Während Such-  und Matching-
modelle positive Effekte prognostizieren, sagen die Humankapitaltheorie und Signal-
theorie negative Effekte voraus. Der berufsorientierte Arbeitsmarkt in Deutschland 
mit seinem starken Kündigungsschutz könnte zur Stigmatisierung von Arbeitslosen 
führen, was sich negativ auf die zukünftige Erwerbskarriere auswirken könnte. Die 
‘trial and error’ Strategie in einem liberalen Arbeitsmarkt wie Großbritannien könnte 
dagegen die berufliche Position nach der Arbeitslosigkeit verbessern. Bei Auswer-
tung der Daten werden GSEP und BHPS Datensätze benutzt und simultan die 
Hazardraten und die Veränderung im beruflichen Status geschätzt. 
 
JEL classification: J64; L50 
 
Keywords: International comparison, occupational mobility, unemployment, young 
workers, educational achievements 
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1  Introduction 
The transition from school to work and the first years of an employment career is a 
turbulent and complex phase for young people. The flows between employment and 
unemployment are a part of allocation processes. While many studies consistently 
report high job mobility via unemployment at the beginning of the employment ca-
reer, the implication of unemployment on future career for young people has been 
less investigated. In this study we argue that, depending on the institutional settings, 
the phase of unemployment might have different consequences for different educa-
tional groups. 
In the UK unemployment is a part of an ongoing relocation process. Non-
standardized, on-the-job training prevails and screening strategies on the job are 
common, which induces many job beginners in the UK to start their first job at a low 
occupational position. A high degree of mismatches combined with low employment 
protection legislation (EPL) allow many entrants to improve their occupational posi-
tions. However, we argue that only highly educated workers might improve their 
initial positions. Higher aspirations, higher levels of savings and better household 
support make the better educated more likely to wait until they find a job that im-
proves their occupational position. In contrast, waiting for a better job offer might not 
be the best strategy for poorly educated workers, because of decreased demand for 
low skilled labour. In addition, the low level of unemployment benefits from previous 
salaries, the regime of sanctions linked to the right to receive unemployment bene-
fits, and low household incomes push them to take the first available job. 
A strongly skill-  and occupation-based labour market with robust EPL creates a 
strongly segmented insider-outsider labour market in Germany that reduces inter-
firm and inter-occupational mobility. The ‘trial and error’ strategy to improve initial 
positions in rigid labour markets is less common than in liberal countries. Thus, a 
phase of unemployment might have a negative impact on all educational groups. 
This study contributes to research on job mobility in several aspects. While many 
studies have tested theoretical models without taking into account the institutional 
contexts that structure the labour market in Germany and the UK (Abbring/Berg/ 
Gautier/Lomwel/Ours 1998,  Kahn/Low 1982,  Boheim/Taylor 2000), we systemati-
cally discuss the impact of institutional settings of the British and German labour 
markets on different educational groups. Other studies do not differentiate between 
job beginners and older workers (Gangl 2006, Arulampalam 2001, Gregory/Jukes 
2001). Since the mechanisms are different for job beginners and workers in their 
middle and later employment career, we discuss labour market theories for job be-
ginners. Furthermore, studies on the effect of unemployment do not differentiate 
between educational groups. Since the meaning of unemployment phases might be 
different for different educational groups, we take a closer look at risk and chances 
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2  Institutional Settings 
Institutional settings have important implications for job search and matching theo-
ries and for human capital and signalling theories. Production regimes, educational 
and vocational system, and EPL are usually identified as key elements of institu-
tional settings when explaining outcomes for the labour market. 
First we will discuss the differences in institutional settings between the UK and 
Germany. Starting with the educational system there are substantial differences 
early on, at the secondary education level. In the UK comprehensive schools for 
pupils dominate while in Germany the pupils are separated into three school forms 
(Hauptschule, Realschule and Gymnasium). While many attempts aiming at the 
standardization and centralization of general education in Great Britain (Steinmann 
1998/1999) have been successfully implemented, the standardization of the voca-
tional system can be considered a failure. The standardization and stratification of 
general education included cumulative qualifications, along with ability testing, hier-
archy of higher educational institutions, a minimum school-leaving age, the introduc-
tion of comprehensive schools and of general school qualification, and most impor-
tantly, the launch of a national curriculum (Hillmert 2002). The standardization and 
stratification of vocational training proved difficult to achieve because in Great Brit-
ain, like in most uncoordinated market economies, collective actors pursued oppos-
ing interests. New measures were likewise met with disapproval from the public. In 
1983, the government implemented the Youth Training Scheme (YTS) to facilitate 
the entry of poorly qualified youth into the labour market. At first glance, the program 
seems to have been successful, but a closer look reveals problems. The employers 
used the program as a screening strategy to identify promising workers and to hire 
them, instead of waiting until they ended their apprenticeships (Bynner 1999). Thus 
in practice, the information about young people’s abilities was more important than 
their training. Furthermore, the vague content and considerable status variance of 
YTS failed to provide the employers with reliable information. Some efforts have 
been made to classify and standardize practical and transferable vocational skills 
(National Vocational Qualifications, NVQ) but these can also be considered a failure. 
Germany is associated with an exceptionally tight linkage between individual educa-
tion and job status (Diprete/Degraaf/Luijkx/Tahlin/Blossfeld 1997, Gangl 2004, Kurz/ 
Buchholz/Schmelzer/Blossfeld 2008). The structure of the vocational system creates 
a strongly skill- and occupation-based labour market (Soskice 1999). Such a system 
trains the majority (about 65 per cent) of the German workforce and provides the 
labour market with skilled workers, which allows a smooth transition into the labour 
market. Since in coordinated market economies vocational training standards are 
partly arranged according to companies’ requirements, employers refer to vocational 
certificates as signals for the employee’s key qualifications. Employees use such 
qualifications as a basis for negotiations for acquiring a suitable entry wage offer. 
Both sides, employees and employers, are interested in a good match, which allows 
employees to offset their training costs and employers to save on-the-job training IAB-Discussion Paper 25/2011  7 
costs. A high level of standardization lowers the risks of unintended job mismatches
1 
and guarantees that acquired human capital will quickly be translated into high pro-
ductivity. 
Production regimes influence industrial relationships in types of work councils, col-
lective bargaining systems, the coordination of vocational institutions, and employ-
ment protection legislation (EPL) (Diprete et al. 1997, Soskice 1999, Streeck 1984). 
In contrast to uncoordinated market economies, coordinated market economies like 
Germany are characterized by trust transactions (e.g., expressed by long-term fi-
nancing of firms, functional flexibility of employees, cooperation between employ-
ees, firms, and educational institutions etc.) that foster employers’ commitment to 
long-term relationships with their employees. Labour markets in economies with 
closed employment relations tend to separate the insiders from the outsiders 
(Sørensen 1983): insiders enjoy certain outcomes of negotiations between unions 
and employers while for outsiders it is rather difficult to become an insider. High EPL 
combined with elaborate legal constraints in Germany lead to more screening before 
hiring, as it is more costly for firms to fire ‘bad’ workers afterwards. Thus, in the 
German context, strongly skill-based allocation patterns and strong EPL provide 
adequate starting occupational positions for those with adequate job allocation. Fur-
thermore, a strongly skill- and occupation-based labour market with elaborate legal 
constraints on employers generates a strongly segmented insider-outsider labour 
market that reduces inter-firm and inter-occupational mobility and fosters internal job 
promotions. Thus, the institutional context in Germany not only provides adequate 
occupational positions at the beginning of the employment career but also stabilizes 
earnings trajectories offering internal career ladders for those starting in appropriate 
positions. 
The British employment system is classified as an uncoordinated market economy 
with decentralized and dualistic industrial relations. Low-trust relationships involve 
easily monitored and interchangeable workers who have limited scope for influenc-
ing firm-internal decisions (Soskice 1999) EPL in the UK is the weakest in Europe. 
Dismissals or redundancies in the UK are less costly than in Germany (in terms of 
time, money, and procedural complexity). Because of weak EPL and weak linkage 
between the vocational and occupational system the transition into the first job is 
relatively smooth. However, the flip side is the negative impact on the quality of the 
first job (Wolbers 2007). Since non-standardized, on-the-job training prevails and 
screening strategies are common, many job beginners start their first jobs in poor 
occupational positions. Firing costs in the UK and weak signals from academic and 
vocational certificates lead to more screening on-the-job and higher firing rates. 
Therefore, many job beginners might start their first jobs in inadequate and precari-
                                                  
1  Unintended job mismatch means that neither employee nor employer know whether the 
demands of the job correspond to the employee’s skills;. intended job mismatches imply 
that both parties – employee and employer – are aware of the wrong allocation of an em-
ployee. IAB-Discussion Paper 25/2011  8 
ous positions with the prospect of working their way up to better and more qualified 
positions. 
On becoming unemployed low unemployment benefits and a strong sanction regime 
in the UK expose unemployed workers to economic pressure to accept the first 
available job regardless of its quality. By contrast in Germany low economic pres-
sure allows them to search for a good job match. The replacement rates for unem-
ployment are 0.37 in the United Kingdom and 0.66 in Germany for the average pro-
duction worker (Scruggs 2005). However, one should bear in mind that many young 
unemployed are not yet eligible for unemployment benefits because they lack the 
necessary work experience. 
In the last two decades, Germany and especially the UK have experienced a decline 
in the size of the traditional industrial and agricultural sectors. While at the beginning 
of the 1970s the UK and Germany displayed the same degree of industrialization 
(the share of industrial workers was about 35 %), this had already declined to 15 % 
in the UK and to 25 % in Germany by the year 2000. Lower qualified workers have 
borne the main burden of these changes. Rapid technological progress in manufac-
turing led to redundancies among low-qualified male workers in particular, because 
the manufacturing sector increased its output with fewer, but more highly-qualified 
workers. Empirical studies indicate that for every four to five manufacturing jobs that 
were lost in OECD countries through competition with low-wage countries, there 
was an average of one new manufacturing job created through the production of 
high-skill-based manufactured goods (Rowthorn/Ramaswamy 1999). The dramatic 
decline in demand for unskilled and low-skilled workers reduced demand for self-
binding commitments by employers towards low-educated entrants and employers 
are reluctant to invest in low-educated employees (Breen 1997). 
The decline of the manufacturing sector (and agriculture) was accompanied by the 
expansion of the service sector. At the end of the 1990s the proportion of jobs in the 
service sector was over three-quarters of all jobs (OECD 2000). Newly created jobs 
in the service sector become the employment domain of younger workers (Fagan/ 
Halpin/O'reilly 2005). However, while highly educated people might have chances to 
keep up with the technological and structural changes or to switch to service jobs, 
these chances are very low for dismissed, poorly qualified industrial male workers 
(Fagan et al. 2005). 
3  Hypotheses 
In the following sections we discuss the search and matching models, and signal 
and human capital theories as they might apply to different educational groups in the 
institutional contexts of the UK and Germany. 
We introduce two series of questions. In the first series of questions we discuss the 
chances of re-entering employment for different educational groups. Since for the 
first series of questions there is an abundant amount of literature, we will keep this 
section concise. In the second series we will focus on the post-unemployment occu-IAB-Discussion Paper 25/2011  9 
pational status. Though both series represent two sides of the same coin we will 
discuss them separately. 
3.1  Chances of re-employment 
Duration of unemployment is usually discussed within the framework of search and 
matching theories using wages. This argumentation can be also utilized for occupa-
tional status. Job finding is a process of job offers arriving sequentially while workers 
have to decide whether to accept the current offer or to continue job search. In its 
dynamic version the optimal search strategy is to form an aspiration for occupational 
status (reservation wage) at the minimum acceptable offer (Mccall 1970, Jovanovic 
1984). Job search proceeds as long as opportunities costs are low and as long as 
the job searcher expects to receive a better job offer. The job search stops when a 
job offer corresponds to the aspired job (reservation wage). Increasing opportunity 
costs and low chances of receiving an aspired job reduce the expectation towards 
the occupational status of the next job. 
For better qualified persons we expect better re-entry chances than for the poorly 
qualified as deindustrialization, the growing importance of the service sector, and 
technological innovation have reduced the demand for low-educated workers (Breen 
1997, Kurz et al. 2008). Therefore, waiting for the next job offer might not result in 
better outcomes for the poorly qualified. Furthermore, low-educated workers com-
pete with the highly educated and in a labour market with an ample supply of labour, 
the low-educated might be crowded out to the end of the job queue by the better 
educated (Thurow 1975). 
3.2  Occupational status after unemployment phase 
Starting with job search and matching models an unemployment phase might be 
used for an active job search and might result in a better position (Kahn/ Low 1982). 
Weak linkage between educational and employment system, the emphasis on for-
mal education and screening on-the-job strategy enhance the probability of unin-
tended (and intended) job mismatches in the UK which results in low starting posi-
tions even for high-educated entrants (Hillmert 1999). Many highly educated work-
ers start their positions in “stop gap-jobs” that offer the prospect of improving their 
initial position. In such a scenario off-the-job search might be used as an active 
phase to improve occupational position. Weak EPL generates high levels of turnover 
and job mobility. It implies a higher number of vacancies on the labour market. At 
the same time because of high turnover on the labour market unemployment might 
be less stigmatizing than in a rigid labour market. Recent studies emphasize that 
prolonged searching for work is rewarded with a better job (Boheim/Taylor 2000). 
However, the job search period depends on the aspiration of job searchers that re-
flect their productivity, and opportunity costs of the job search (Mccall 1970). Given 
that higher educated workers with their general skills are more appreciated on the 
labour market than low-educated people (Breen 1997) and that they are aware of 
their productivity, they will reject job offers that fall short of their expectations and IAB-Discussion Paper 25/2011  10 
remain unemployed. At the same time high-educated workers have better chances 
of coping with opportunity costs: they receive higher unemployment benefits and 
profit from savings from previous salaries. Furthermore, they are more likely to ex-
perience financial support from their spouses and/or family. Jacob (2005) argues 
that parental support plays a major role influencing not only the duration of unem-
ployment but also the quality of the subsequent job match. In contrast poorly edu-
cated workers have to deal with the high opportunity costs of the job search be-
cause of their low allocation of financial resources and a decrease in demand for 
their skill profiles. High financial pressure on low-educated workers to find a job re-
duces the aspiration to find a better job position. Dolton and O’Neill (1996) report 
that invitations for the ‘RESTART’ program interview coincide with re-integration into 
any job (which includes short-term, temporary and part-time jobs) but the program 
fails to re-integrate workers into solid jobs. 
Since in Germany institutional linkage between the educational and employment 
systems is very strong, many entrants start in adequate positions. Thus, there is 
little scope to improve one’s position. Therefore, search and matching theories in the 
German context are somewhat limited in terms of predicting outcomes after phases 
of unemployment. Though the share of unintended job mismatches in Germany is 
relatively low, mismatches where both the employee and the employer are aware of 
the mismatch (intended mismatch) are not unusual. In Germany those entrants 
starting in mismatched positions become entrapped in such positions with few pros-
pects of improving their initial positions. 
Signalling theory competes with search and matching theories and is often utilized 
to explain negative effects of unemployment. Lacking information on the productivity 
of a prospective employee, employers seek signals which convey information on the 
job applicant (Gibbons/Katz 1991). A (prolonged) unemployment phase is seen as 
providing employers with a signal of low productivity. For the unemployed this im-
plies fewer chances to re-start in jobs that match their skills. Since EPL in Germany 
is strict, employers’ hiring practices are risk-averse. Therefore, the EPL has conse-
quences for the stigmatization of employees on the micro level (behavioural level of 
employers) and aggregates to low employer-initiated turn-over in the labour market 
on the macro level (Gangl 2006). Thus, the stigma attached to unemployment might 
have negative consequences on future career in Germany. 
In contrast, EPL in the UK is weak and low occupational positions at the beginning 
of the employment career are part of an ongoing relocation process; therefore the 
stigmatization of unemployed workers should be less pronounced than in labour 
markets with strict EPL. However, the signalling effect of unemployment might vary 
for different educational groups. The sequential nature of job offers causes job 
searchers either to accept a job offer immediately or to wait for the next job offer. 
Highly educated individuals looking for jobs are aware of their productivity and tend 
therefore not to take the first available job. Rodriguez-Planas  (2004)  found that 
highly productive laid-off workers in the US choose unemployment over a low-paid IAB-Discussion Paper 25/2011  11 
job as a means of signalling their productivity. Thus, a prolonged unemployment 
spell for high-educated workers might be interpreted by employers as an indicator of 
an employee’s high aspiration level. Hence, high-educated workers might be less 
susceptible to status losses upon re-entering the labour market. The low-educated 
are positioned at the bottom of the job queue and an ample supply of unskilled and 
low-skilled labour reduces their chances of receiving a ‘good’ position. Thus, waiting 
for a better job offer might not be the best strategy, as they will probably not receive 
such an offer. Thus, a prolonged job search is interpreted by employers not as a 
signal of their high aspirations, but of their unemployability. 
Human capital theory also contradicts the predictions of search and matching theo-
ries. The scarring effect is mainly explained by devaluation of job-specific skills 
when changing firms. Thus, unemployment scarring is particularly relevant for status 
losses of high-tenure workers with a large stock of firm-specific human capital. Be-
cause in the UK on-the-job training provides employees with firm-specific human 
capital the scar effect due to devaluation of firm-specific human capital should be 
more pronounced in the UK than in Germany. 
As a coordinated market economy with a high degree of manufacturing industrializa-
tion, Germany provides more workers with clear-cut occupational profiles. In the UK 
the demand for general human capital in the service sector is high and the educa-
tion system has quickly adjusted its capacities to meet this demand. Since devalua-
tion of general human capital proceeds more slowly than the devaluation of occupa-
tion profiles in manufacturing industries, the prolonged duration of unemployment is 
more scarring for workers holding middle and higher educational degrees in Ger-
many than in the UK. General human capital is more easily transferable across firms 
and is mainly acquired through formal education. Thus, when comparing the high- 
and low-educated in the UK, we can also expect that the high-educated are in a 
better position since their broad academic skills make them less dependent on the 
accumulation of job-specific skills, at least at the beginning of their employment ca-
reer. 
Summary of Hypotheses 
Confronting human capital and signal models with search and matching models 
against the institutional context in the UK and Germany we have formulated the fol-
lowing hypotheses. 
Since in the UK EPL is weak and linkage between educational and employment 
system is weak, wrong job allocations at the beginning of employment is a part of 
the employment career. The unemployment phase in the UK might be used to im-
prove occupational position. 
H1 a: We expect, however, that only high-educated workers will improve their occu-
pational position in the UK. The increasing demand for high-educated workers en-
hances their chances to find a better job match. The high-educated workers are IAB-Discussion Paper 25/2011  12 
aware of their productivity and their chances on the labour market and thus have 
high expectations towards the occupational position of the next job. 
H1 b: For the same reason we expect that prolonged job search might improve their 
occupational positions. The sequential nature of job offers causes job searchers 
either to accept a job offer immediately or to wait for the next job offer. The less 
clear-cut occupational profiles in the UK make waiting for the next job offer rationally 
appealing. Higher previous salaries and savings, higher unemployment benefits 
from previous gross salaries, and higher household incomes allow the high-
educated to cope with opportunity costs arising from the job search. High-educated 
workers might also choose unemployment over a low-paid job as a means of signal-
ling their productivity. Thus waiting for a better job offer might be a good strategy to 
improve their occupational positions. 
H1 c: In contrast, the low-educated are positioned at the bottom of the job queue 
and an ample supply of unskilled and low-skilled labour reduces their chances of 
receiving a ‘good’ position. Furthermore, the low unemployment benefits from previ-
ous salaries, the sanction regime for the right to receive unemployment benefits, 
and low household incomes do not buffer their opportunity searching costs, forcing 
them to reduce their job aspirations. A prolonged job search might be interpreted by 
employers not as a signal of their high aspirations, but of their unemployability. 
Thus, we expect that unemployment will not improve their occupational position. 
H1 d: By the same token, waiting for a better job offer might not be the best strategy, 
as they will probably not receive such an offer. Therefore, a prolonged job search 
might have a negative impact on the post-unemployment occupational status. 
H2 a: Due to human capital and signalling theories we expect a negative effect of 
unemployment on occupational status for all educational groups in Germany. 
H2 b: The rapid depreciation of occupational skills might be especially scarring for 
highly educated workers compared with low-educated workers. Thus, a prolonged 
job search might have a negative effect on occupational status. 
H3: Considering the re-entry chances we expect that compared to high-qualified 
workers the decreased demand for low-skilled labour reduces the re-entry chances 
of low-qualified workers in both countries. 
H4: Service sector jobs have become the main destination for young women in both 
countries. Non-employed women are also more likely to restart in service jobs than 
men (Fagan et al. 2005). Since the human capital in the service sector is also more 
easily transferable than in manufacturing industries, we expect that women should 
perform better than men in improving their occupational positions upon re-entering 
the labour market. IAB-Discussion Paper 25/2011  13 
4  Data and methods 
4.1  Data 
The analyses of this acticle are based on representative longitudinal data from the 
German Socio-economic Panel (GSOEP), conducted by the German Institute for 
Economic Research (DIW) in Berlin and from the British Household Panel Survey 
(BHPS), conducted by the Institute for Social and Economic Research (ISER). Addi-
tionally for the UK study we use retrospective data since 1985 (Maré 2006). The 
analysis is based on people aged between 16 and 30 at the entry into the labour 
market after the last completed education and who became unemployed between 
1985 and 2006. The time horizon in the sample is the first 10 years after entering 
the labour market. Those respondents who entered employment after the age of 30 
are excluded from the sample. The marginally employed are not considered as an 
entry into the labour market. Therefore, only those with an unemployment spell who 
had worked in a solid job are included in the sample. Employment spells lasting less 
than 12 months and lying between two educational spells are not considered as the 
first job. Jobs before military (civil) service are also not considered as the first job. In 
defining unemployment, we adopt the ILO definition of being jobless but available for 
paid employment. 
Since our focus is the effect of unemployment a spell of unemployment following 
other interruption spells (for example: additional education => unemployment spell) 
are excluded from our sample. The rationale behind such a definition is that other 
states might trigger the event of unemployment. Those employment interruptions 
(inactivity and additional education) that follow an unemployment spell are not     
excluded from the sample but are controlled for. The final sample consists of 781 
people with 15343 person month observations for Germany and 751 persons and 
9384 year observations for the UK. 
4.2  Statistical model 
Though the job search theory was formulated in terms of wages we will utilize this 
concept for occupational status. The aspiration status wr (reservation wage) is de-
fined by the following equation: 
  (1) 
A person accepts the job offer with observed status wo if wo > wr with:  
  (2) 
The value of wo is observable if wo exceeds the value of wr. Since the threshold level 
is unknown this threshold level is formalized by the latent variable d (Long 1997). 
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In an article of 1988 Petersen formalized a model with continuous dependent vari-
able that estimates hazard rates at the shift of the dependent variable and the 
change of the value of the dependent variable in one model. However, his study 
does not go beyond theoretical formalization of the model. In his study he estimates 
the hazard rate with conventional event history analysis in the first step and the 
status change in dependent variable wo by using OLS regression in the second step. 
In his study (1988) he assumes that  . Such an assumption is thor-
oughly justifiable when modelling the upward and downward status mobility for on-
the-job search framework (job-to-job mobility) because given the transition (the shift 
of status value) one also observes the change in value of dependent variable. How-
ever, selection upon re-entry into the labour market in the off-the-job framework 
(mobility via unemployment) might bias the results, as for example some unem-
ployed persons might prefer to stay unemployed when the job offers do not corre-
spond to the aspiration level (reservation wages). Furthermore, as Gangl (2002) 
correctly notifies, the status outcomes might be conditionally dependent on the re-
employment rate  and therefore suggests to use Hackman’s selection model and 
also to account for selection bias and to test for conditional independence between 
re-employment rates and status outcomes. By properly arranging the data structure 
we will utilize full-information maximum likelihood estimator (FIML)  estimator for 
event history analysis. For these reason we split the data on the monthly basis to 
apply Heckman’s FIML estimator for discrete event history analysis. Using FIML 
estimator we also avoid the practical problem of identification for Heckman’s two 
step estimator when the variables in both equations are the same (xo = zr) and the 
linearity between λ(.) and values βr zr  (Wooldridge 2002). 
Since some characteristics of an individual might influence re-entry chances and at 
the same time have an impact on status outcome, the equation (2) might lead to 
biased results. 
If the mean value of uo is not zero then the expected value of wo is: 
  (3) 
Under joint normality assumption of uo and ur we will estimate equation (3) using 
FIML estimator. An individual contributes to log-likelihood with two parts: (1) The 
likelihood contribution from observations with d = 0, i.e. the probability of not yet 
being observed in the regression equation; (2) The likelihood contribution from ob-
servations with event d = 1, i.e. the probability of being observed multiplied with the 
conditional density of the observed value. 
The probability at time point t not to observe the outcome variable wo is (for details 
see Long 1997): 
  (4) 
Taking that ur is normally standard distributed than: 
  (5) IAB-Discussion Paper 25/2011  15 
with Φ as distribution function of the standard normal distribution. Since sigma is not 
identifiable it is set to 1. 
The probability to observe the status (uncensored observations) is: 
  (6) 
The conditional density of the observed value is:  . Note vector z 
represents covariates for reemployment rates zr and covariates xo for the outcome 
variable wo (occupational status). Using Bayes rule: 
 
The observed part contributes to maximum likelyhood estimator: 
  (7) 
One individual contributes to maximum log-likelihood with unobserved part (5) and 
observed part (7) with log probability: 
 (8) 
Note that in a single episode framework of discrete event history analysis the event 
(observed part) can occur only once when being at risk. Thus, the observed part 
(d=1) of the equation (8) is identical to Hackman’s correction estimator. In contrast, 
until the event occurs an individual might contribute several times with unobserved 
part (d=0) to maximum log-likelihood. Thus, the unobserved part is the sum of log 
probabilities of those who not yet have experienced an event and reflects the con-
cept of survival function. 
Using the Heckman’s estimator we simultaneously estimate the parameters (βr) for 
hazard part of the model and the change of occupational status (βo). We investigate 
the status change (∆wo = wo upon re-entry - wo before job loss) because the focus of this study 
is not the absolute occupational standing after unemployment but whether the job 
searcher loses or improves their occupational status via unemployment. We meas-
ure mobility with a Socio-Economic Index of Occupational Status (ISEI) and not by 
hourly wage for several reasons (ISEI scale, see Ganzeboom/Treiman 1996).
2 First 
of all, while the wage growth at the beginning of the employment career is a “natu-
ral” phenomenon in Germany and especially in the UK (as well as in other coun-
                                                  
2  Status scores are assigned to occupational titles (on the basis of information from the 
ISCO-88 classification) according to a scale that ranges from 16 for occupations with the 
lowest status to 90 for occupations with the highest status. IAB-Discussion Paper 25/2011  16 
tries), the occupational status measured in the ISEI score reflects the improvement 
of occupational positions. Secondly, the retrospective data for the UK does not in-
clude wage information, which leaves us with low case numbers (especially for high-
educated individuals). Thirdly, not all employment episodes in the BHPS sample 
contain working hours, which makes the reconstruction of the hourly gross wage a 
difficult task. ρor reflects whether the status outcomes are conditionally dependent 
on the reemployment rate. 
In the following models we use the following variables. Educational groups based on 
CASMIN classification: (primary = inadequately completed or completed compulsory 
education without any qualification; basic vocational education = general elementary 
education and vocational qualification; academic secondary = secondary education 
does not provide any occupational qualification, i.e. is designed to provide an ac-
cess to tertiary education; technical secondary = secondary or post-secondary non-
tertiary programs providing vocational qualification; tertiary: lower stage of tertiary 
education with occupation-oriented programs and traditional university); Region 
(four regions created from twelve official regions: North, South, Middle, Scotland or 
UK and three regions for Germany: South Germany, North Germany and East Ger-
many); Gender; Duration of the job search (in months); Branch of industry prior to 
unemployment (based on a modified (Singelmann 1978) classification by collapsing 
transformative or distributive industries); Firm size of previous job for Germany;
3 
Age at the labour market entry; Dummy variables for the years of interview; and 
Dummies for ethnicity variable (German = 1, British = 1). We also control for em-
ployment interruptions (inactivity, additional training, maternity leave, and taking 
care of relatives) that follow the phase of unemployment. 
The models will be introduced in the following way: in the first equation, that reflects 
the hazard part, we introduce all control variables starting from the first model. In the 




In the model 1 we introduced in the linear part (AV=occupational status) the dummy 
variables for education (see Table).
5  Year dummies and variables for additional 
                                                  
3   For the UK the firm size is not available for retrospective data. 
4   Due to the tendency of unemployment gap closure in retrospective data in the UK the 
comparison between the cohorts belonging to retrospective and panel data provides less 
reliable results. For these reason, we estimated models using panel data only. The re-
sults with and without retrospective data are virtually identical. 
5   We estimated also OLS regression. While coefficients for educational groups of OLS are 
identical with coefficients of FIML estimotr for the UK, these coefficients are hevealy 
downward biased in OLS regression in Germany, especially for tertiary education (aout 5 
points). Indeed, the likelihood-ratio test between an independent probit model for the se-
lection equation and a regression model on the observed outcome variable (occupational 
status) against the Heckman model justifies application of Heckman`s selection correc-
tion for Germany while for UK the likelyhood-ratio test proved to be not significant.  IAB-Discussion Paper 25/2011  17 
education and inactivity following unemployment are controlled for (coefficients are 
not shown).
6 While we find substantial losses for workers with tertiary education 
(about 6 points), the losses for other educatinonal groups in Germany are less pro-
nounced.
7 Thus, we can only partly confirm the hypotheses H2 a (status losses for 
all educational groups). We can confirm hypotheses for the UK: H1 a while the re-
sults are clearly pronounced (and significant) for persons holding tertiary education 
and (about 6 points), H1 c the status gains for lower qualified persons are small (and 
not significant). In model 2 we introduced variables for number of unemployment 
interruptions, gender, job tenure in the last job, and duration of unemployment. We 
also control in model 2 for branch of industry, firm size (in Germany), and regions. 
Each unemployment phase reduces the occupational status by 2 points for Ger-
many and by 1 point in the UK (though not significant). It is also interesting that each 
unemployment phase enhances the re-entry chances in the UK and worsens re-
entry chances in Germany (see coefficient in the hazard rate part). These results 
support the main assumption of this study: while unemployment phase has no nega-
tive effect on the future career in the UK, we find path-dependencies for Germany. 
Compared to men, women improve their occupational positions in both countries by 
about two points. We trace these results back to de-industrialization: dismissed 
manufacturing workers are disproportionally men who find it more difficult to find 
adequate positions (H4). Job tenure of the last job has no effect on occupational 
status in Germany but does in the UK. We interpret these results in the light of job-
specific human capital. In the UK vocational skills are very often learned on the job 
that makes job-specific human capital an important component of human capital in 
the UK. In Germany job-specific skills are less important than vocational skills that 
are highly standardized. 
Considering the re-entry chances we argued that the decreased demand for low-
skilled labour reduce the re-entry chances of low-educated workers compared to the 
high-educated workers in both countries (H3). Indeed, according to the hazard part 
of the model the higher-qualified workers are more likely to re-enter the labour mar-
ket than lower-qualified workers in both countries (Model 1 – Model 4). 
                                                  
6   Since short-term unemployment duration might be endogenous – the job searcher might 
have already a better position in a new job before terminating the old job – we also esti-
mated models keeping only those workers who spend more than one month in unem-
ployment. While for the UK the coefficients in question do not differ considerably, we find 
substantial differences for Germany: in the model with all unemployed workers we find no 
status losses in Germany (model not shown), the results change if we exclude those 
workers with one month (or two months) in unemployment (Model 1). In the proceeding 
models for Germany we will therefore confine our sample only for those who were more 
than one month unemployment. 
7   We added the coefficients for educational achievements with constant (0.87 + 4.65 ≈ 6 
points). IAB-Discussion Paper 25/2011  18 
Table 
Unemployment duration and changes in post-unemployment occupational status 
  Germany  UK 
∆ occupational status             
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
Constant  -0.87  39.77***  38.18***  0.09  30.82***  31.42*** 
Education (ref. primary)             
Basic vocational  -2.77+  -3.70*  -2.66  0.05  0.58  0.67 
Academic secondary  -1.92  0.00  -0.16  2.41  1.91  1.41 
Technical secondary  -1.55  -4.68**  -1.63  1.33  -1.16  -0.94 
Tertiary  -4.65*  -7.28**  -4.76  5.50*  4.31+  2.66 
Number of unempl.    -2.10+  -2.37*    -1.23  -1.28 
Woman (=1)    2.09*  1.96+    1.78  1.77 
Full-time tenure    -0.09  -0.09    -0.25***  -0.25*** 
Full-time tenure (sq)    0.00*  0.00*    0.00**  0.00** 
Part-tenure tenure    -0.05  -0.06    -0.18*  -0.17* 
Unempl. experience    -0.54**  -0.35+    0.12+  0.10 
Unempl. experience x             
Basic vocational      -0.09      -0.02 
Academic secondary      0.00      0.07 
Technical secondary      -0.20***      -0.10 
Tertiary      -0.21+      0.34* 
Unempl. exp. (sq.)     0.02**  0.01*       
Unempl. exp. (cub) x 10
3    -0.01**  -0.01*       
Hazard part             
Constant  -1.28***  -1.30***  -1.30***  -1.60***  -1.63***  -1.63*** 
Education (ref. primary)             
Basic vocational  0.16**  0.16**  0.16**  -0.03  -0.03  -0.03 
Academic secondary  0.10  0.11  0.11  0.09  0.08  0.08 
Technical secondary  0.27***  0.29***  0.29***  0.23**  0.23**  0.23** 
Tertiary  0.45***  0.48***  0.48***  0.22**  0.23**  0.23** 
Number of unempl.  -0.15**  -0.15**  -0.15**  0.12**  0.12**  0.12** 
Woman  -0.05  -0.04  -0.04  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01 
Full-time tenure  -0.01*  -0.01*  -0.01*  0.00  0.00+  0.00+ 
Full-time tenure (sq)  0.00**  0.00**  0.00**  -0.00  -0.00  -0.00 
Part-tenure tenure  -0.01***  -0.01***  -0.01***  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Unempl. experience  -0.02***  -0.02***  -0.02***  -0.04***  -0.03***  -0.03*** 
Unempl. exp. (sq.) x 10
3  0.08***  0.08***  0.08***  0.01***  0.01***  0.01*** 
Unempl. exp. (cub) x 10
4  -0.06***  -0.06***  -0.06***       
Rho (ur,uo)  0.04  -0.16  -0.18  -0.06  -0.87***  -0.88*** 
N of subjects at risk  1148  1148  1148  1347  1347  1347 
Numeber of failures  752  752  752  940  940  940 
Number of observations  15343  15343  15343  9384  9384  9384 
LL  -5788.57  -5760.17  -5752.58  -6838.30  -6818.70  -6815.86 
Notes:  
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
Full set of control variables: kind of employment interruption following phase of unemployment, firm size (for Ger-
many), gender, region, branch of industry of the last job, dummies for ethnicity variables, dummy variables for the 
years of interview. 
Source:   GSEP: 1984-2006; BHPS: 1991-2006. 
 
As we argued in the theoretical section the duration of the search might have differ-
ent consequences for different educational groups in both countries. In the UK the 
prolonged job search might have positive consequences for high-educated workers 
(H1 b). For those in the labour market with less clear-cut occupational profiles, wait-
ing for a better job offer might be a good strategy to improve their occupational posi-
tions. Higher previous salaries and savings, higher unemployment benefits from 
previous gross salaries, and higher household incomes allow the high-educated to IAB-Discussion Paper 25/2011  19 
cope with opportunity costs arising from the job search. In contrast, an ample supply 
of unskilled and low-skilled labour combined with low unemployment benefits, the 
sanction regime, and low family support buffer their opportunity searching costs, 
forcing them to take the first available job (H1 d). In Germany young people start in 
higher positions than in the UK and the devaluation of occupational skills is more 
pronounced for high-educated persons than for low-educated workers (H2 b). To 
test these hypotheses we interacted the duration of unemployment with educational 
variables (in ∆wo  occupational status).
8 All in all we can confirm the hypotheses. In Ger-
many those with tertiary and technical secondary achievements lose in status with 
each month of unemployment. In the UK prolonged job search rewards persons with 
tertiary education but not other groups: persons with tertiary education improve their 
status by 0.46 points a month (significant at p < 0.001 level).
9 
6  Summary and Discussion 
Taking countries with two different institutional settings we contribute to the research 
on occupational mobility for young people in several aspects. First, we systemati-
cally discuss the impact of institutional settings of the British and German labour 
markets on re-employment for different educational groups. While many tther stud-
ies do not differentiate between job beginners and older workers (Gangl 2006, 
Arulampalam 2001, Gregory/Jukes 2001), we discuss labour market theories for job 
beginners. Furthermore, since the meaning of unemployment phases might be dif-
ferent for different educational groups, we take a closer look at risk and chances of 
unemployment for different educational groups. 
Non-standardized, on-the-job training and screening strategies on the job are com-
mon in UK, which results in low occupational starting positions. A high degree of 
mismatches and low employment protection legislation (EPL) assign the employ-
ment careers in the UK a transitory character with the prospect of working the way 
up to better and more qualified positions. However, we argued that only the highly-
educated workers might improve their initial positions. Higher aspirations, higher 
levels of savings and better family support make high-educated people wait until 
they find an adequate job. For low-educated workers, waiting for a better job offer 
might be not the best strategy. The low level of unemployment benefits from previ-
ous salaries, the regime of sanctions linked to the right to receive unemployment 
benefits, and low family support push them to take the first available job. 
In Germany a strongly skill- and occupation-based labour market with robust EPL 
creates a strongly segmented insider-outsider labour market that reduces overall 
occupational mobility. The ‘trial and error’ strategy to improve initial positions in rigid 
                                                  
8   Note we also introduced unemployment duration squared and it cubic form. However, we 
use only those polynominals that turns out to be significant in our models. 
9   The main effect of the job search was added with the interaction effect and tested with 
Wald Test Statistic for significance. IAB-Discussion Paper 25/2011  20 
labour markets is less common than in liberal countries and the stigma attached to 
unemployment might penalize all workers irrespective their educational achieve-
ments. 
We can confirm our expectation regarding the UK: only high-educated workers im-
prove their occupational positions, while there are no improvements (but also no 
status losses) for lower educational groups. According to our expectations we also 
find that each month of unemployment search rewards high-educated workers but 
not low-educated workers. For Germany our expectations are less clear-cut: we find 
slight penalties for all educational groups (though not significant). However, when 
we close short unemployment gaps we find substantial losses in occupational status 
for workers holding tertiary education. We find also that each month of unemploy-
ment penalizes only high-educated workers, which is in accordance with our argu-
mentation: devaluation of occupational skills is more rapid for high-qualified than for 
low-qualified educational groups. 
Summarizing the results it becomes evident that the application of labor market 
theories should be applied with caution in different institutional contexts. Strong EPL 
and a tight linkage between vocational training and skill demands create a strongly 
skill-based labor market that guarantees adequate job positions and good job per-
spectives in Germany. An unemployment spell aggregates to a negative signal that 
leads to necative outcomes for all educational groups. In contrast, in liberal coun-
tries weak EPL and weak linkage between vocational and occupational system 
make job beginners start their first jobs in inadequate positions with the prospect of 
working their way up to better and more qualified positions. 
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